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The Capital Investment Planning Aid with Air Planning Update (CIPA APU) is a 
force structure planning tool that can be used to suggest ship, submarine, and aircraft 
procurement and retirement schedules over a 30-year horizon. These plans represent over 
a $1 Trillion commitment to ensure the Navy stays capable to fulfill its missions. Navy 
long-range force structure planners at the Chief of Naval Operations, Assessment 
Division (N81), currently manually prepare alternate future ship, submarine, and aircraft 
procurement and retirement schedules and evaluate these with a contractor-developed 
spreadsheet tool. This tool, the Extended Planning Annex/Total Obligated Authority 
(EPA/TOA) model, estimates the financial impact of any complete future plan over a 30-
year horizon. While manually preparing such plans, N81 Force Structure Planners must 
consider annual budget, industrial base, and force structure requirements expressed in 
terms of the number of platforms needed to support a mission. With yearly time fidelity, 
CIPA APU replaces manual planning with optimized budget planning, with, for example, 
19 mission areas, 19 ship classes, 58 aircraft types, five ship-production facilities, and 
three categories of money.  CIPA APU tracks average aircraft age, expected attrition, and 
allows planners to specify a platform’s mission suitability. It also provides expeditious 
feedback to requests for alternate scenario feasibility and budget impact. We demonstrate 


























The reader is cautioned that the computer programs developed in this research 
may not have been exercised for all cases of interest. While every effort has been made, 
within the time available, to ensure that the programs are free of computational and logic 
errors, they cannot be considered validated. Any application of these programs without 
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The Capital Investment Planning Aid with Air Planning Update (CIPA APU) is a 
force structure planning tool that can be used to suggest ship, submarine, and aircraft 
procurement and retirement schedules over a 30-year horizon. These plans represent over 
a $1 Trillion commitment to ensure the Navy stays ready to fulfill its missions. Navy 
long-range force structure planners at the Chief of Naval Operations, Assessment 
Division (N81), currently manually prepare alternate future ship, submarine, and aircraft 
procurement and retirement schedules and evaluate these with a contractor-developed 
spreadsheet tool. When provided a complete procurement and retirement schedule as 
input, this tool, the Extended Planning Annex/Total Obligated Authority (EPA/TOA) 
model, estimates the financial impact of any complete future plan over a 30-year horizon. 
CIPA APU replaces manual planning with optimization, recommending the best 
yearly force structure procurement plan based on industrial constraints, budget 
constraints, mission inventory requirements, and force mix requirements. CIPA APU 
allows budget violations in some years that can be repaid by other savings in other years. 
This is accomplished with long-term, cumulative budget goals. Given constraints for a 
planning scenario, CIPA APU recommends an optimum solution. CIPA APU can 
emulate EPA/TOA if CIPA APU’s discretionary variables are all fixed to constant 
values. But, as a prescriptive model, CIPA APU suggests optimum solutions that might 
not otherwise be discovered by manual planning and EPA/TOA evaluation.  
CIPA APU builds on a prior CIPA optimization-based decision support system 
that has been custom built for N81 and packaged in a user-friendly graphic user interface. 
This thesis focuses on improving the underlying optimization modeling for aircraft 
procurement and retirement scheduling with the expectation that these new features will 
be added to the custom built decision support system. Most CIPA APU improvements 
center around tracking aircraft average age. Such tracking allows CIPA APU to model 
increasing Operation and Maintenance Navy (OMN) costs as aircraft age increases and 
model an age-dependent aircraft effectiveness of an aircraft type for a mission. 
We demonstrate CIPA APU with a few realistic scenarios that plan for 19 mission 
areas, 19 ship classes, 58 aircraft types, five ship-production facilities, and three 
 xvii
categories of money. These scenarios highlight how CIPA APU optimally alters 
procurement and retirement schedules to respond to:  increasing OMN costs as aircraft 
ages increase; different effectiveness for aircraft performing Strike Fighter and Ground 
Attack missions; and the introduction of Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV) and Unmanned 
Combat Air Vehicles (UCAV). Results show that explicit consideration of aircraft age 
and varying effectiveness for mission performance have a pronounced effect on optimal 
procurement and retirement planning. 
CIPA is the only Navy decision support system that integrates aircraft and ship 
procurement decisions with fiscal, industrial, and mission requirements to render the best 
integrated long-term advice. When added to CIPA, the CIPA APU enhancements will 
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I. PROCUREMENT AND RETIREMENT PLANNING FOR NAVY SHIPS 
AND AIRCRAFT  
The U. S. Navy will spend more than $1 Trillion over the next 30 years to procure 
ships, submarines, and aircraft that will keep it capable to fulfill its missions. Navy long-
range force structure planners at the Chief of Naval Operations, Assessment Division 
(N81), currently manually explore alternate future ship, submarine, and aircraft 
procurement and retirement schedules aided only by a contractor developed spreadsheet 
tool. The spreadsheet tool, the Extended Planning Annex/Total Obligated Authority 
(EPA/TOA) model, estimates the financial impact of any complete future plan over a 30-
year horizon. N81 Force Structure Planners must manually consider annual budget, 
industrial base, and force structure requirements expressed in terms of the number of 
platforms needed to support all missions required. 
CIPA (Capital Investment Planning Aid), introduced by Field [1999], with the 
aircraft extensions described here, is a force structure planning tool that complements the 
EPA/TOA model. The changes to CIPA are referred to here collectively as CIPA APU 
(Air Planning Update). CIPA APU allows Navy force structure planners to quickly 
evaluate the impact of changes in budget and/or force structure requirements. For 
scenarios considered in this thesis, CIPA APU optimizes annual procurement and 
retirement planning for 25 years, 19 mission areas, 19 ship classes, 58 aircraft types, five 
ship production facilities, and three categories of money. The 58 aircraft types support 14 
of the 19 mission areas. In addition to the preexisting features of CIPA [Field 1999, 
Baran 2000], CIPA APU now considers aircraft-specific budget constraints, aircraft 
mission effectiveness, aircraft attrition, minimum and maximum average aircraft age, 
minimum and maximum average aircraft age designated for a specific mission, and 


























II. BUDGET PLANNING STRATEGY 
The Navy budget for Fiscal Year 2002 is $99 billion. As of 5 September 2001, the 
2003 and beyond annual Navy budget was expected to be cut to $80 billion [Holzer 
2001]. Since then, a new worldwide military operation lead by deployed Navy ships and 
aircraft may have changed this forecast. The point is that budget and force structure 
planners must constantly develop plans to respond to emergent guidance from the 
Secretary of Defense and Chief of Naval Operations while meeting tight budget limits. 
The priorities set within this guidance are always changing. CIPA APU augments current 
force structure planning tools and ushers in the use of optimization based decision models 
for N81 force structure and budget planning. 
 
A. CHANGING PRIORITIES 
N81 planners face many problems determining and dealing with force structure 
priorities. Priorities change for many reasons including: a new President and 
administration, world events, new technologies and systems. CIPA APU can help address 
some of the competing priorities and allow planners to quickly explore optimized 
solutions to their ever-changing environment. Below we provide many recent examples 
of scenarios that must be considered by N81 Force Structure Planners. 
 
1. New Administration 
The Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) outlines the missions the U.S. military 
services must fulfill to satisfy United States National Military Strategy. The George W. 
Bush administration plan for sizing the force structure started with a pledge to put 
strategy priorities first and budget priorities second [Scarborough 2001a]. President Bush 
directed Defense Secretary Rumsfeld to conduct a total review of the 1.36 million person 
armed forces and reorganize it to meet the 21st century threats.  President Bush told our 
troops, “We must put strategy first, then spending. Our defense vision will drive our 
defense budget; not the other way around.” Rumsfeld requested a $329 billion 2002 
budget, the largest one-year defense increase since the 1980’s. Rumsfeld implied that the 
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2002 budget is still considered far less funding than required to meet existing National 
Military Strategy.  Rumsfeld argued that the armed forces have been so under funded and 
overused in the 1990s that one budget cycle cannot repair all the damage [Scarborough 
2001a]. 
Rumsfeld stated that the average age of aircraft has gone up about 10 years since 
the 1990s and high maintenance costs are consuming the budget [Thomas 2001]. The 
Navy is forced to invest valuable maintenance man-hours on aircraft cannibalization, 
transferring scarce parts from aircraft to aircraft. Rumsfeld states that the “ship-building 
budget at the current rate is on a trajectory from 310 ships to 230 ships” [Thomas 2001]. 
The Bush administration’s challenge is persuading Congress to supply the money 
necessary to fix this aging fleet.  
The initial 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) guidance stated that the 
U.S. forces must be sized and shaped to concurrently perform three major tasks: defend 
the U. S. against attacks on the homeland or on defense-related information 
infrastructure; deter forward in critical areas of the world; and win decisively against an 
adversary in any one of these critical areas of the world [Grossman 2001]. Secretary 
Rumsfeld later revised the QDR guidance to eliminate the requirement to perform the 
major tasks concurrently.  This change to QDR guidance reflects the tough compromises 
being made to fulfill mission requirements while meeting tight budget realities. Defense 
planners acknowledge that the mismatch between strategy and resources has created a 
very large number of budget shortfalls. One of these is military modernization. The 
military wants to get away from having aircraft, ships, and other equipment that are 
extremely old that drive up operating and maintenance costs [Weinberger 2001]. 
Facing future budgets as much as $20 billion less than what they expect to receive 
in 2002, U.S. Navy officials are eyeing deep cuts in force structure, primarily in aviation 
assets. Navy budget planners have been given guidance from Pentagon officials to expect 
budgets in 2003 and beyond to be about $80 billion per year.  This level is far below the 
$99 billion the service is set to receive in 2002.  Some of the proposed Naval aviation 
cuts include retiring an aircraft carrier in 2004, retiring all AV-8B Harriers by 2005, 
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retiring all F-14s by 2006 instead of 2009, retiring two P-3 maritime patrol squadrons in 
2004, and retiring two Naval Reserve P-3 squadrons in 2003 [Holzer 2001]. 
 
2. World Events and Responses in Force Structure Planning 
World events impact our Defense budget and force structure planning. The USS 
Cole attack [Navy Public Affairs Library, 2000] and the EP-3 collision with a Chinese 
fighter [Navy Public Affairs Library, 2001] are recent examples with minimal initial 
impact on Naval inventories, but with potential widespread influence on force structure 
planning. 
On 11 September 2001, terrorists crashed two hijacked commercial airliners into 
the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York and a third jet into the Pentagon 
[Rhem 2001]. In the wake of these terrorist attacks, Congress approved $40 billion in 
emergency defense funds. The Pentagon plans to spend half of the first $2.5 billion 
installment on intelligence upgrades and is expected to spend an additional $1 billion 
with the next installment [Capaccio 2001]. The Pentagon plan is to improve Intelligence 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft and to buy more unmanned 
reconnaissance planes and privately-owned satellite imagery. The Pentagon wants more 
specialized airborne and ground sensors that can spot and analyze fixed or moving 
targets. The 2001 QDR now includes specific allocations of money and tasks to 
homeland defense [Liang 2001]. It will take almost a year after the 2001 QDR release to 
refine the areas involving personnel, the National Guard, and Reserves. Part of the first 
installment includes $200 million for repairs to the Pentagon and increased fuel costs; 
$196 million for increased flying hours, maintenance, ship steaming, and mobilizing the 
National Guard. 
The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks have increased efforts to upgrade the 
Pentagon's aging fleets of surveillance and tanker aircraft. The Navy is considering 
accelerating purchases of C-40 transport planes to replace its much older C-9 cargo 
planes [Pasztor et al. 2001]. 
Since President Bush declared war on terrorism, more money has been promised 
to the Defense Department. The QDR retains 12 Navy carriers [Scarborough 2001b].  
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The big question is whether more money will be available to upgrade the rest of the fleet. 
Anti-terrorist operations will place more wear and tear on the combat fleet that is already 
in urgent need of updated platforms. Another question is what additional money will be 
provided to pay for operating and maintaining the Navy’s ships and planes already 
deployed in support of the war on terrorism. The United States must be prepared for 
homeland defense and information warfare in the wake of recent events. 
 
3. New Systems 
New technologies and systems change the way we perceive and react to threats. 
These altered perceptions serve to shape our National Military Strategy, the Defense 
Planning Guidance, and consequently our force structure planning. The tri-service, multi-
national Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program (Figure 1), V-22 Osprey, Unmanned Combat 
Air Vehicle (UCAV), and Unmanned Air Vehicle (UAV), are aircraft examples that will 
impact our force structure for the next decade and beyond. 
 
Figure 1. An artist’s rendition of the Lockheed Martin Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). 
The procurement plan calls for the Navy to buy 480 carrier versions and 609 Marine 
Corps short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) versions. The $200 billion JSF 
contract is the largest in U.S. military history. Figure from - [LockheedMartin.com, 
2001]. 
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The Pentagon has been considering eliminating the Marine Corps’ short take-off 
and vertical landing (STOVL) requirements from the JSF program to reduce costs and 
speed up the overall JSF program schedule [Wolfe 2001]. One option being discussed is 
an acceleration of the Navy JSF program and a termination of the Navy’s F/A-18E/F after 
the current buy ends in FY04. The early lots of JSF are to be less capable than those 
bought later. The current JSF procurement plan calls for the Navy to buy 480 Navy 
carrier versions, and 609 Marine Corps STOVL versions to replace its AV-8B Harriers. 
Many assumed the Pentagon would split the more than $200 billion JSF contract, 
the largest in U.S. military history, to keep both main fighter-jet makers (Boeing and 
Lockheed Martin) in the business for decades. If the contract were split, upfront costs 
would jump between $900 million and $1.4 billion to accommodate the two separate 
production lines. This was a contingency that Navy planners had to consider. Senator 
Christopher Bond (R-MO) considered the added expense “well worth the price" for the 
$200 billion JSF program as it would keep both companies in the fighter manufacturing 
business and would preserve competition and make it easier to speed up production if 
needed [Selinger 2001]. In the end, the Pentagon selected Lockheed Martin as the sole 
contract winner. 
The Marine Corps would get $592.3 million less than requested and build nine 
instead of 12 V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft next year under the new defense bill 
approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee [Whittle 2001]. A special Pentagon 
panel recommended that the Pentagon hold Osprey production to a minimum while flaws 
that led to one of last year's crashes are fixed. The Marines want 360 V-22s to replace 
Vietnam-era helicopters. 
To reduce combat fatalities, new systems such as the Predator Unmanned Air 
Vehicle (UAV) are being used to support Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
missions while minimizing risk to our pilots and aircrew. The Unmanned Combat Air 
Vehicle (UCAV), Figure 2, is the next step toward minimizing combat fatalities while 
supporting two major combat roles: Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) and 
precision strike. The initial operational capability of the UCAV system is now planned 
for approximately 2010 [Baker 2001]. 
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Figure 2. An artist’s rendition of the Boeing Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle 
(UCAV). The UCAV is the next step toward minimizing combat fatalities while 
supporting two major combat roles: Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses and precision 
strike. Figure from - [Boeing.com, 2001]. 
 
The multi-billion dollar JSF, V-22, UAV, and UCAV programs may affect our 
defense budget for decades and significantly alter the way we prepare for and fight future 
battles. Force structure planners require flexible tools to deal with new system 
capabilities, uncertainties, and vulnerabilities. 
 
B. N78 AND N81 METHODS 
The Chief of Naval Operations, Air Warfare Division (N78), works closely with 
N81 to shape present and future Naval Aviation warfighting capabilities. N78 determines 
required aviation force levels necessary to support our National Military Strategy and 
Defense Planning Guidance. N81 incorporates N78 inputs into the overall Navy force 
structure plan. 
 
1. N78 Force Structure Planning 
Force structure planners at N78 must maintain air warfighting capabilities to meet 
present and future threats, using aircraft modernization, procurement, and retirement 
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scheduling. Currently, planners strive to support 10 active and 1 reserve Carrier Air 
Wings (CVW) with at least 50 tactical aircraft and support aircraft per wing [Paine and 
Drohr 2000]. Planners must also support 3 active and 1 reserve Marine Air Wings. The 
inventory required for each specific aircraft is determined by first establishing the number 
of squadrons of that type of aircraft that will support each wing. The total Primary 
Mission Aircraft Authorized (PMAA) number of squadrons multiplied by number of 
aircraft per squadron is the basis for all future inventory calculations [Paine and Drohr 
2000]. To determine an overall procurement objective for each aircraft, the PMAA must 
be supplemented to account for training aircraft, test and evaluation aircraft, and aircraft 
undergoing maintenance. Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) training aircraft account for 
about a 25% inventory increase. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) 
aircraft account for about a 7% increase. Aircraft in the maintenance pipeline add about 
10%. Finally, planners must adjust for annual aircraft attrition, which ranges from a 
fraction of a percent to almost 3% per year depending on the aircraft. The grand total of 
the above adjustments results in a procurement objective for each aircraft. 
 
2. EPA/TOA at N81 
N81 contracts with Systems Planning and Analysis, Incorporated, to maintain the 
EPA/TOA model. EPA/TOA is a series of 62 linked spreadsheets that are manually 
manipulated to reflect planning considerations and scenario development. The EPA/TOA 
model estimates long-range Navy force structure costs. This cost estimation is based on a 
manually prepared input with a procurement, delivery, and retirement schedule. Field 
[1999] presents an N81 planning review that is still current at this writing. 
 
C. CAPITAL INVESTMENT PLANNING AID (CIPA) 
The Capital Investment Planning Aid (CIPA) is designed to augment the 
EPA/TOA model by using optimization to replace much of the manual work performed 
by EPA/TOA contractors and N81 planners. CIPA has been tested with a 25-year 
planning horizon with eight mission areas, 19 ship classes, five aircraft types, five 
production facilities, and three categories of money. CIPA recommends the best yearly 
force structure procurement plan based on industrial constraints, budget constraints, 
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mission inventory requirements, and force mix requirements. CIPA allows budget 
violations in some years that can be repaid by other savings in other years. Given 
constraints for a planning scenario, CIPA recommends an optimum solution. CIPA can 
emulate EPA/TOA if CIPA’s discretionary variables are all fixed to constant values. But, 
as a prescriptive model, CIPA suggests optimum solutions that might not otherwise be 
discovered by manual planning and EPA/TOA evaluation. CIPA has been demonstrated 
for a 25-year plan with a representative subset of ships, submarines, aircraft, and three 
major budget categories. [Field 1999] 
 
D. A CIPA EXTENSION: GENERALIZING PROCUREMENT PLANNING 
FOR NAVAL SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT (GENSA) 
 Generalizing Procurement Planning for Naval Ships and Aircraft (GENSA), 
extends CIPA to include additional ship classes, aircraft types, and Manpower Navy 
(MPN) funding [Baran 2000]. GENSA extends the planning horizon to 30 years, 29 
mission areas, 45 ship classes, 30 aircraft types, and 13 production facilities. GENSA is 
designed to add more detail to the CIPA model while easing post-optimization analysis. 
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III. OPTIMIZED PROCUREMENT AND RETIREMENT PLANNING FOR 
NAVY SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT 
A. CIPA APU MODEL OVERVIEW 
CIPA APU optimizes, with annual fidelity over a 25-year planning horizon, 
procurement and retirement planning for 58 aircraft types supporting 14 air mission areas 
while considering several categories of budget constraints, aircraft mission effectiveness, 
aircraft attrition, minimum and maximum average aircraft age, minimum and maximum 
average aircraft age designated for a specific mission, and minimum aircraft retirement 
age. CIPA APU has incorporated air budget constraints to allow flexibility to meet both 
political and warfare community priorities while striving for optimum overall Navy 
budget usage. CIPA APU models increased operating and maintenance costs as each 
aircraft ages, accounts for aircraft average ages, and accumulates expected flight hours. 
Tracking age also allows us to assess mission performance as a function of average age 
and to plan realistic retirement scheduling based on age. Aircraft inventory is also 
adjusted according to historical attrition rates that are reflected in CIPA APU as the 
yearly survival rate of each aircraft. 
 
B. NEW CIPA APU MODEL FEATURES 
 
1. Air Budget Constraints 
Officials believe the Navy needs to explore new long-term operational and force 
concepts to provide better information on future requirements and capabilities [General 
Accounting Office (GAO) 2001]. The GAO concluded that “implementing the Navy’s 
transformation will be complicated and will require careful consideration of near-term 
needs, as well as fundamental changes in the force structure, concepts, and organizations 
required to meet future security challenges within likely budgets” [GAO 2001 p.16]. The 
GAO suggests this transformation will involve using improved decision support systems 
performing resource and asset optimization [GAO 2001 p.21]. 
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Budget is a major factor determining a force structure plan. Currently, planners 
explore force structure scenarios that are bounded by budget limits. In FY2001, the Air 
Procurement Navy (APN) limit was nominally $6.2 billion, with TACAIR receiving half 
[Ruck 2001]. These seemingly arbitrary limits serve as good starting points as the Navy 
divides up its total service budget. When no bounds are set on overall APN and specific 
mission APN, CIPA APU will spend as much as needed to meet overall Navy budget and 
air mission requirements. CIPA APU introduces cumulative elastic [Brown, Dell, and 
Wood 1997] air budget and air mission budget constraints to replicate planning limits. 
The elastic variables allow budget violations in some years that can be repaid in others. 
This flexibility can be key when trying to start production of a new airframe. 
 
2. Aircraft Average Age 
Reduced procurement in the 1990s has left the military with aging aircraft that are 
increasingly expensive to maintain [Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 2001]. Many 
aircraft are being flown well beyond their expected service life in order to meet crucial 
mission needs. The force structure plan must retire its aging aircraft while replacing those 
aircraft with an affordable mix of new and upgraded aircraft.  
Brown, Clemence, Tuefert, and Wood [1991] develop a large-scale capital 
budgeting model, named PHOENIX, to aid Army helicopter force planners modernize an 
aging Army fleet composed of Vietnam era aircraft. CIPA APU uses average age 
constraints similar to those in the PHOENIX model. As an aircraft inventory reaches the 
maximum average age limit, older aircraft provide a retirement option to balance mission 
inventory needs with maximum age limits. Violations of maximum average age may be 
tolerated with a policy penalty to discourage excessive delays of necessary retirements. 
 
3. Operating and Maintenance Costs as Function of Age 
The Navy’s aircraft inventory is aging and it is the only Navy weapon system type 
that has significantly increased in average age. Over the last 20 years, aircraft average age 
has risen from 11 years to more than 16 years. In contrast, the average age of ships has 
changed very little. 
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The aging aircraft (Figure 3) inventory has required more funding to maintain 
older equipment at the expense of new procurement, which has in turn lead to even older 
systems being kept in inventory with still higher OMN costs [Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) 2001]. CBO agrees that aircraft do become more costly to maintain as they 
age. Aircraft OMN increases by 1 percent to 3 percent for every additional year of age, 
after adjusting for inflation. Aging aircraft, part shortages, and high operations tempo are 
draining funds [Brown 2001]. 
CIPA APU indexes OMN costs by aircraft type and age. OMN costs can be 
expressed as a function of aircraft age, which is more realistic than assuming OMN costs 
remain fixed over the aircraft’s service life. Reality may conflict with planning: OMN 
budgets are sometimes held fixed as an aircraft ages, resulting in parts shortfalls, reduced 
mission capability, and reduced morale. If we plan for increasing costs, we prepare for a 
likely future. 
 
Figure 3. An embellished Navy Times cover story photo of a duct taped F-14A. 
Operating and Maintenance costs are increasing between one and three percent per year. 
Spare parts shortfalls are causing increased cannibalization and forcing Navy maintainers 
to work harder and smarter to maintain full mission-capable aircraft. Figure from - 
[Fondersmith, 2001]. 
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4. Mission Effectiveness 
 
Each aircraft type within a mission area may have different effectiveness from its 
cohorts. The F18AB may be less effective than the proposed JSFN in the Strike Fighter 
air mission area. It is difficult to quantify relative mission effectiveness. 
The F/A-18E/F program conducted a detailed analysis to determine the overall 
combat effectiveness of its aircraft [Navy Public Affairs Library 1997]. A poll of experts, 
aviators, aeronautical engineers, and intelligence specialists within the intelligence 
community, were asked their opinion of aircraft capabilities in six important areas of 
merit: maneuverability, range, radar signature, radar guided weapons, infrared weapons, 
and avionics suite.  
Mission effectiveness is evidently a function of the empty gross weight of an 
aircraft and its vintage [Van Brabant 2001]. This makes sense because larger aircraft 
usually have a longer range, can carry more weapons, have larger radar antennas and 
power sources and thus have greater radar detection ranges. Conversely, a larger aircraft 
might be less maneuverable and have a larger radar cross section. Because technology 
changes significantly over time, the era in which an aircraft is conceived affects the 
platform’s ability to integrate advanced weapons and avionics. Stealth, sensor integration, 
and human factor improvements also affect combat performance and are a function of 
aircraft vintage. CIPA APU uses aircraft and air mission average age constraints to limit 
the number of aircraft kept in inventory beyond their service lives. 
 
C. CIPA APU FORMULATION 
The summary below outlines the primary model characteristics. The complete 
CIPA APU formulation is found in the Appendix. 
 
Main Decision Variables: 
 
• number of aircraft to procure at the start of a fiscal year; 
• number of aircraft to retire at the end of a fiscal year that is a specific age; 
• number of ships to procure at the start of a fiscal year; 
• number of ships to retire at the end of a fiscal year; and 
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Minimize the penalty for violating constraints for the following areas:  
 
 Annual air and ship mission inventory; 
 Annual aircraft and air mission average age; 
 Annual and cumulative total budget; 
 Annual air and cumulative air budget; 
 Annual air mission and cumulative air mission budget; and 
 Annual ship labor requirements. 
 
Subject to the following annual constraints: 
 
• Limit annual minimum ship inventory; 
• Limit the annual number of ships produced per plant; 
• Limit annual ship retirements; 
• Limit annual maximum ship-plant labor; 
 
• Limit annual minimum aircraft inventory; 
• Limit the annual number of aircraft produced; 
• Limit annual aircraft retirements; 
• Limit annual maximum aircraft average age; 
• Limit annual maximum air mission average age; 
 
• Limit minimum and maximum annual and cumulative total budget; 
• Limit minimum and maximum annual air and cumulative air budget; and 






























IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
A. IMPLEMENTATION 
CIPA APU is implemented in the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) 
[Brooke et al. 1998] with the CPLEX solver, Version 6.6 [ILOG 2001]. CIPA APU is a 
mixed-integer linear program, which for a representative scenario exhibits about 114,000 
equations and 167,000 variables, of which about 6,700 are binary variables. It generally 
runs in less than 7 minutes on a personal computer equipped with a Pentium III 700 MHZ 
processor and 1048 MB of RAM, when accepting any solution guaranteed to be within 
10% of optimal. 
 CIPA APU adds new elastic constraints to the previous CIPA models [Field 1999, 
Baran 2000]. CIPA APU uses upper and lower elastic constraints for the overall air 
budget, cumulative air budget, air mission budget, and cumulative air mission budget 
limits. Upper elastic constraints are used for maximum aircraft average age and air 
mission average age limits. 
CIPA APU introduces penalties associated with the new elastic variables. Similar 
to the CIPA implementation, budget excesses and shortages are penalized at a 7% rate 
(1.07 multiplied by the unit budget violation) and all other penalties are based on this 
rate. Labor and mission penalties are unchanged from prior CIPA implementations [Field 
1999, Baran 2000]. The penalty for violating average age constraints is equal to the 
maximum OMN cost per year, for each respective aircraft or mission area. All of the 
aforementioned penalty values, if active, are held constant for the entire planning 
horizon. 
CIPA APU schedules procurement only if production can be completed and 
delivery accepted within the scenario’s planning horizon (FY04-FY28). Therefore, near 
the end of this scenario’s planning horizon, procurements decrease to zero. For purposes 
of results reported here, FY24 to FY28 may be truncated from the planning results 




B. VARIABLES AND PARAMETERS 
Because CIPA APU needs to account for aircraft age, planning starts with the 
expected aircraft inventory, rounded to the nearest integer year, at the beginning of the 
planning horizon. Table 1 shows that the total F/A-18E inventory at the start of the 
planning horizon, FY04, is expected to be 61.  
 
Table 1. Initial FY04 Aircraft Age Inventory. For example, of 61 F18Es: 15 are 
two years old. 





















CIPA APU uses as much of the existing CIPA and EPA/TOA data as possible to 
ensure model integration, consistency, and continuity. The most significant data changes 
deal with the new constraints for overall APN, air mission APN, air mission average age, 
aircraft average age, relative air mission effectiveness, and aircraft OMN costs. 
Maximum APN is prototypically set to $6.2 billion annually, with a nominal 
lower bound of $5.4 billion. These budget limits are held constant for the entire planning 
horizon. Cumulative air budget limits are simply the sum of all previous annual yearly 
budgets. Budget limits are also imposed on the Strike Fighter mission area, with a 
maximum of $3.1 billion and a minimum of $2.7 billion. The other 13 air mission areas 
have no separate air mission budget limits. 
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Aircraft average age limits are set using three different profiles. If the aircraft 
average age at the start of the planning horizon is younger than it’s expected service life 
(ESL), the maximum average age limit is held constant at the respective ESL. If the 
aircraft has already exceeded it’s service life, either the maximum average age limit is 
held constant somewhere above the ESL or it is set one year older than current average 
age and linearly decreased until the ESL limit is reached. The third profile accounts for a 
large variability in aircraft age associated with procuring aircraft over several years. In 
this case, some individual aircraft will reach their ESL before the aircraft type average 
age reaches the maximum age limit. This may cause an aircraft to remain in inventory 
long after its ESL. To account for this, we set the maximum average age limit below the 
ESL limit and linearly increase it until the ESL limit is reached. In this scenario, a 
constant limit profile is predominantly used except in cases where the ESL is already 
exceeded. In those cases, a linearly decreased limit is used as described above. 
CIPA APU introduces survival, retirement, and air mission effectiveness 
parameters. Yearly aircraft survival rates mimic EPA/TOA yearly attrition rates. The 
minimum retirement age parameter limits aircraft to “retire no earlier than” 50% of ESL. 
For example, if the F-14B’s ESL is 30 years, no F-14B is retired unless it is at least 15 
years old. The mission effectiveness parameter values can be highly subjective and are all 
initially set to 1.0. This means any aircraft assigned to a specific air mission is viewed as 
fully capable to perform that air mission. 
 
C. RESULTS OF SEVERAL PLANNING EXCURSIONS 
We report on several realistic CIPA APU excursions. First, we present a baseline 
case from which we compare the other excursions. Second, CIPA APU emulates a 
notional N81 mission inventory example. Third, we increase OMN costs as a function of 
increasing aircraft age. Fourth, we change relative Strike Fighter and Ground Attack air 
mission effectiveness to explore planning impact.  Finally, we include UAV and UCAV 




1. Baseline Case 
This baseline case includes air budget and air mission budget constraints as 














FY04 6.2 5.4 6.2 5.4
FY05 6.2 5.4 12.4 10.8
FY06 6.2 5.4 18.6 16.2
FY07 6.2 5.4 24.8 21.6
FY08 6.2 5.4 31.0 27.0
FY09 6.2 5.4 37.2 32.4
FY10 6.2 5.4 43.4 37.8
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
Table 2. Air Budget and Cumulative Air Budget Table (Billions of Dollars). The 
maximum APN is set to $6.2 billion with a nominal lower bound of $5.4 billion. These 
budget limits are held constant for the entire planning horizon. Cumulative air budget 















Strike Fighter FY04 3.1 2.7 3.1 2.7
Strike Fighter FY05 3.1 2.7 6.2 5.4
Strike Fighter FY06 3.1 2.7 9.3 8.1
Strike Fighter FY07 3.1 2.7 12.4 10.8
Strike Fighter FY08 3.1 2.7 15.5 13.5
Strike Fighter FY09 3.1 2.7 18.6 16.2
Strike Fighter FY10 3.1 2.7 21.7 18.9
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
Table 3. Air Mission Budget and Cumulative Air Mission Budget Table (Billions 
of Dollars). The maximum Strike Fighter air mission budget is $3.1 billion with a 
minimum budget of $2.7 billion. Cumulative air mission budget limit are derived from 
these limits. 
 
The minimum yearly procurement limit is zero for all aircraft with a generous 
maximum yearly procurement level set for those aircraft scheduled for procurement 
during the planning horizon. Table 4 shows the F18F maximum procurement over the 
planning horizon is 320 aircraft, 40 aircraft per year from FY04 through FY11. The N81 
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plan procures approximately 200 aircraft over that same time. Aircraft committed for 
delivery in FY04 and FY05 are specific lots of aircraft which are purchased in FY02 and 
FY03. Those aircraft will be delivered two years later and are viewed as committed 
procurement in the year they are delivered. 
Mission inventory levels are set high enough to require aircraft procurements to 
meet mission inventory requirements. The Strike Fighter mission inventory level is 1100 
aircraft, the Ground Attack mission inventory level is 500 aircraft. These levels match the 
N81 TACAIR inventory level, 1300, and account for the 300 additional AH1 and UH1 









F18F FY04 0 40 24
F18F FY05 0 40 24
F18F FY06 0 40 0
F18F FY07 0 40 0
F18F FY08 0 40 0
F18F FY09 0 40 0
F18F FY10 0 40 0
F18F FY11 0 40 0
F18F FY12 0 0 0
F18F FY13 0 0 0
F18F FY14 0 0 0
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
Table 4. Yearly F18F Procurement Limits. The F18F maximum procurement over 
the planning horizon is 320 aircraft, 40 aircraft per year from FY04 through FY11. The 
N81 plan procures approximately 200 aircraft over that same time period.  
 
Figure 4 shows the CIPA APU TACAIR inventory projection. CIPA APU 
TACAIR inventory is Strike Fighter and Ground Attack mission areas combined without 
attack helicopters. The TACAIR inventory goal is approximately 1300 aircraft. CIPA 
APU aircraft procurements are restricted due to lack of sufficient funding. The most 
inexpensive aircraft, F18E and F18F, are viewed more favorably for procurement than 
the more expensive JSFN and JSFMC aircraft. 
The overall air budget and TACAIR budget is shown in Figure 5. The CIPA APU 
solution minimizes the penalties associated with violating the respective air budget and 
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air mission budget limits. The previously discussed end effects are apparent as 
procurement spending goes to zero near the end of the planning horizon. Although budget 
violations exist for both air and mission budget limits, the average yearly budget for the 
















































































Figure 4. Baseline, CIPA APU TACAIR Inventory Projection. Planned 
procurements are restricted due to lack of sufficient funding. The most inexpensive 
aircraft, F18E and F18F, are viewed more favorably for procurement than the more 











































































Figure 5. Baseline, CIPA APU Air Budget Chart. End effects are apparent as 
procurement spending goes to zero near the end of the planning horizon. The “bow 
wave” at the beginning of the planning horizon represents initial expenditures to repair 
deficiencies. These are repaid in later years. Although budget violations exist for both air 
and mission budget limits, the average yearly budget for the planning is less than the 
maximum yearly budget limit. 
2. Excursion 1: Restrict CIPA APU to emulate a notional N81 Plan 
CIPA APU can be forced to emulate a manual schedule and then results can be 
compared with EPA/TOA. Figure 6 shows a notional N81 TACAIR inventory projection 
as entered in EPA/TOA during May 2001.  Figure 7 shows the CIPA APU emulation for 
comparison. Retirement schedules differ slightly between the notional N81 plan and 
those allowed in CIPA APU which accounts for the bow-wave in aircraft inventory, 
FY10-FY18, as shown in Figure 7. The N81 TACAIR inventory level is relatively steady 
















































































Figure 6. Notional N81 TACAIR Inventory Projection. This sample inventory 
projection attempts to maintain approximately 1300 tactical aircraft but does so using 
significantly more dollars than were available in the baseline scenario (Figure 5) and by 




















































































Figure 7. Excursion 1a, CIPA APU TACAIR Inventory Projection. Because there is 
insufficient funding, the minimum number of aircraft are procured each year. The 













































































Figure 8. Excursion 1a, CIPA APU Air Budget Projection. The average yearly air 
budget required to support this procurement plan is about $10.5 billion. The average 
yearly Strike Fighter air mission budget is about $4.2 billion. 
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We now focus on the procurement results. Regardless of budget limits, CIPA 
APU produces the desired procurement schedule at the expense of violating the baseline 
air and mission budget limits (Figure 8). With the budget limits still set at the baseline 
case level, the optimized plan selects the minimum procurement levels available. We can 
control this behavior and honor budgets at the expense of procurement schedule, but 










F18F FY04 0 40 24
F18F FY05 0 40 24
F18F FY06 24 40 0
F18F FY07 24 40 0
F18F FY08 24 40 0
F18F FY09 24 40 0
F18F FY10 24 40 0
F18F FY11 24 40 0
F18F FY12 0 0 0
F18F FY13 0 0 0
F18F FY14 0 0 0
. . . . .
. . . . .
. . . . .
Table 5. Revised Yearly F18F Procurement Limits. This revised table includes 
minimum procurement limits that attempt to emulate the notional N81 procurement plan. 
 
We allow CIPA APU to optimize the desired aircraft procurements, by running 
the model again, this time with annual budget levels centered around $10.5 billion. 
Similarly, we set a reasonable bound around the average Strike Fighter air mission 
budget, $4.2 billion. When the model is run again without the minimum procurement 
limits, CIPA APU fulfills the mission requirements with the revised budget limits, 
Figures 9 and 10. The total air budget stays within the limits better than the Strike Fighter 
air mission budget because we impose a penalty for yearly and cumulative air budget 
violations and imposed only a cumulative air mission penalty for Strike Fighter air 
















































































Figure 9. Excursion 1b, CIPA APU Inventory Projection. By allowing CIPA APU 
more flexibility, we obtain similar inventory levels to those obtained in Figure 7 but with 






































































Air Budget TACAIR Budget Max Air Budget Min Air Budget Max TACAIR Budget Min TACAIR Budget
 
“End Effects” 
Figure 10. Excursion 1b, CIPA APU Air Budget Projection. The total air budget 
stays within the limits while satisfying required inventory levels (Figure 9). We impose a 
penalty for yearly and cumulative air budget violations and impose only a cumulative air 
mission penalty for the Strike Fighter air mission budget violations. 
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3. Excursion 2: OMN as Function of Age 
OMN costs change over time. In this excursion, we hold the OMN cost constant 
up to the average age of the aircraft at the start of the planning horizon. From that average 
age forward, we increase aircraft OMN costs 3% per year of age until the maximum age 
limit, 60 years old. For example, the expected F-14D average age is 15.8 years at the start 
of the planning horizon. The OMN cost is held constant at $2.96 million per year for all 
F14Ds 16 years old or younger. OMN costs are increased 3% per year of age for every 
year after 16. These increases are in constant year dollars. 
 
Table 6. OMN as Function of Aircraft Age. We hold OMN cost constant up to the 
average age of the aircraft at the start of the planning horizon. We increase aircraft OMN 
costs 3% per year of age until the age limit, 60 years old. 
Aircraft Type Years Age OMN
. . .
F14D FY04 through FY28 14 2.96
F14D FY04 through FY29 15 2.96
F14D FY04 through FY30 16 2.96
F14D FY04 through FY31 17 3.05
F14D FY04 through FY32 18 3.14









This excursion sets air budget limits around $10.5 billion per year and Strike 
Fighter air mission budget limits around $4.2 billion per year as before. Likewise, we set 
only maximum aircraft procurement limits. 
Figure 11 shows aging F14B’s are retired earlier than in excursion 1 with 
accelerated F18E and F18F procurement. By increasing the OMN costs 3% per year of 

















































































Figure 11. Excursion 2, CIPA APU Inventory Projection. We increase OMN costs 
3% per aircraft year of age and bound air budgets around $10.5 and $4.2 billion, with no 
minimum procurement limits. In FY06, aging F14B’s have earlier retirements and 





































































Air Budget TACAIR Budget Max Air Budget Min Air Budget Max TACAIR Budget Min TACAIR Budget
 
“End Effects” 
Figure 12. Excursion 2, CIPA APU Air Budget Projection. The increased OMN costs 




4. Excursion 3: Mission Effectiveness 
All aircraft within the same mission area are not equally effective. In this 
excursion, aircraft mission effectiveness is subjectively set within the Strike Fighter and 
Ground Attack air missions. The author sets the values in relation to the aircraft’s vintage 
and perceived capability in their respective mission area. JSFN and JSFMC are the 
reference aircraft for their respective Strike Fighter and the Ground Attack air missions. 
We change the Strike Fighter inventory goal to 900 aircraft and the Ground Attack 
inventory goal to 400 aircraft. 
 
Air Mission Aircraft Type Age Effectiveness
Strike Fighter F14A 1 through 60 0.75
Strike Fighter F14B 1 through 60 0.85
Strike Fighter F14D 1 through 60 0.85
Strike Fighter F18AB 1 through 60 0.75
Strike Fighter F18CD 1 through 60 0.85
Strike Fighter F18E 1 through 60 0.95
Strike Fighter F18F 1 through 60 0.95
Strike Fighter JSFN 1 through 60 1.00
Ground Attack AV8B 1 through 60 0.75
Ground Attack AH1 1 through 60 0.75
Ground Attack UH1 1 through 60 0.75
Ground Attack JSFMC 1 through 60 1.00
Table 7. Relative Aircraft Mission Effectiveness for Strike Fighter and Ground 
Attack Air Missions. JSFN and JSFMC are the reference aircraft for their respective 
Strike Fighter and the Ground Attack air missions. We change the Strike Fighter 
inventory goal to 900 aircraft and the Ground Attack inventory goal to 400 aircraft. 
 
The most effective aircraft are viewed more favorably for procurement and less 
favorably for retirement. The F14B and F18CD have delayed retirements compared to 
excursion 1b results. Changing the relative air mission effectiveness and air mission 
















































































Figure 13. Excursion 3 (Varying Aircraft Effectiveness), CIPA APU Inventory 
Projection. The most effective aircraft are viewed more favorably for procurement and 
less favorably for retirement. The F14B and F18CD have delayed retirements compared 






































































Air Budget TACAIR Budget Max Air Budget Min Air Budget Max TACAIR Budget Min TACAIR Budget
 
“End Effects” 
Figure 14. Excursion 3, CIPA APU Air Budget Projection. Changing the relative air 
mission effectiveness and air mission inventory goals affect the associated TACAIR 
yearly budgeting results shown in Figure 12. 
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5. Excursion 4: New Air Platforms 
The UAV and UCAV aircraft are added to the respective aircraft and air mission 
inventory lists to see the possible affects of these new platforms on force structure 
planning. The Naval UAV is expected to cost about $900,000 per aircraft, the UCAV is 
expected to cost about $5.25 million per aircraft [UAV Forum 2001]. The expected 
service life for these aircraft is 12 and 6 years, respectively. The lifecycle OMN for the 
UCAV is expected to be about $7.5 million [AerospaceWeb.org 2001]. The author takes 
the liberty of estimating the respective cost curves and yearly OMN costs based on the 
previous data, using scaling similar to that of aircraft currently being procured. Because 
these aircraft are significantly cheaper than other aircraft in their mission areas and are 
less capable, we reduce the UAV and UCAV mission effectiveness to balance the cost 
differential. For this excursion, the UAV and UCAV have only 50% relative mission 
effectiveness with a maximum procurement of 200 UAV and 300 UCAV. In addition, we 
eliminate F18E and F18F minimum procurements while setting JSFN and JSFMC 
minimum procurement levels to honor contract commitments. For this excursion, JSFN 
and JSFMC maximum total procurement was cut in half over the planning horizon. 
The first “hump” in inventory level, Figure 15, is caused by forced minimum JSF 
procurement between FY08 and FY18. The second “hump” is an a correction to pay the 
cumulative liability of the early over-expenditure, Figure 16. The unmanned aircraft, 
cheaper and less expensive to operate and maintain, are procured to their maximum levels 
once the mission deficit penalty exceeds the budget limit penalties. Although we set no 
minimum F18E and F18F procurement limits, the F18E and F18F are still procured to 
meet the mission inventory goal. Initial UCAV procurement is delayed almost eight 


















































































Figure 15. Excursion 4, CIPA APU Inventory Projection. The unmanned aircraft, 
cheaper and less expensive to operate and maintain, are procured to their maximum levels 
once the mission deficit penalty exceeds the budget limit penalties. Although we set no 
minimum F18E and F18F procurement limits, they are still procured to meet the mission 
inventory goal. Initial UCAV procurement is delayed almost eight years until funding 












































































Figure 16. Excursion 4, CIPA APU Air Budget Projection. Early F18E and F18F 
procurements to meet mission inventory goal and committed JSFN and JSFMC 

























V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
We have explored several scenarios to demonstrate the new CIPA APU 




CIPA APU replaces manual planning with optimization, recommending the best 
yearly force structure procurement plan based on industrial constraints, budget 
constraints, mission inventory requirements, and force mix requirements. CIPA APU 
allows budget violations in some years that can be repaid by other savings in other years. 
This is accomplished with long-term, cumulative budget goals. Given constraints for a 
planning scenario, CIPA APU recommends an optimum solution. As a prescriptive 
model, CIPA APU suggests optimum solutions that might not otherwise be discovered by 
manual planning. 
Prototypic scenarios have shown how CIPA APU optimally alters procurement 
and retirement schedules to respond to:  increasing Operation and Maintenance Navy 
(OMN) costs as aircraft ages increase; different effectiveness for aircraft performing 
Strike Fighter and Ground Attack missions; and the introduction of Unmanned Air 
Vehicles (UAV) and Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAV).  
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Enrich the scope and vision of Navy force structure planning to accommodate as 
many of the essential details as possible while generating optimal plans. CIPA is the only 
Navy decision support system that integrates aircraft and ship procurement decisions with 
fiscal, industrial, and mission requirements to render the best integrated long-term advice. 
When added to CIPA, the CIPA APU enhancements will more realistically model the 



























APPENDIX.     CIPA APU FORMULATION 




Y,  set of years (planning periods) of the planning horizon;  For Yyy ∈', .
convenience it is assumed that Y  |}|...,3,2,1{ Y=
T,  set of aircraft ages; t . For convenience it is assumed that Tt ∈',




A,  set of aircraft types;  Aa ∈




AM ,  set of air missions;  AMm ∈
SM ,  set of ship missions;  SMm ∈
AAm ⊆ , subset of aircraft types that perform mission  AMm ∈




aI ,  set of cost increments for aircraft ; i  Aa ∈ aI∈
P,  set of production facilities;  Pp ∈
PPs ⊆ , subset of facilities that produce ship class  Ss ∈
spyQ ,  set of quantities available for ship  procurement at facility  in  Ss ∈ sPp ∈
  year y ∈ . This set is defined in terms of the Y
spy
sproc  and spysproc  
  parameters (see below) as follows: 















The word “procurement” or “to procure” refers to “delivery” or “to deliver”, respectively, 
unless explicitly stated otherwise. Therefore, we refer to “procure” as the action that 
takes place at the moment (year) that the platform is delivered and available for use from 
that year onwards, regardless when the real “procurement” arrangements were made. 
 
The words “time period” and “year” are used interchangeably. 
 
The words “facility” and “plant” are used interchangeably. 
 
 Objective-terms: Penalties 
 
ampenm, penalty for shortage in completing air mission m ($ per aircraft) AM∈
smpenm, penalty for shortage in completing ship mission  ($ per ship) SMm ∈
agepena, penalty for aircraft average age excess ($ per year of age) 
magepenm, penalty for air mission average age excess ($ per year of age) AMm ∈
+
ybpen ,  penalty for budget excess ($ per $) 
−
ybpen ,  penalty for budget shortage ($ per $) 
+
ycbpen , penalty for cumulative expenses excess ($ per $) 
−
ycbpen , penalty for cumulative expenses shortage ($ per $) 
+




, penalty for air budget shortage in year  ($ per $) Yy∈
ycabpen
−
, penalty for cumulative air budget excess in year  ($ per $) Yy∈
ycabpen
+
, penalty for cumulative air budget shortage in year  ($ per $) Yy∈
myambpen , penalty for air mission budget excess in air mission in year 
AMm ∈
   ($ per $) Yy∈
−
myambpen , penalty for air mission budget shortage in air mission in year  
AMm ∈
  ($ per $) Yy∈
+
mycambpen , penalty for cumulative air mission budget excess in air mission in  
AMm ∈
  year y ($ per $) Y∈
−
mycambpen , penalty for cumulative air mission budget shortage in air mission  




,  penalty for labor excess at plant  ($ per worker) Pp ∈




 Time periods: epochs used for lead and lag events 
 
,SBbsp   number of years before (starting at 0) the procurement of ship class   Ss ∈
  from plant Pp ∈  requires budget (i.e. in 0,1,...  years before) s 1−spSBb
(# years) 
,SCbsp   number of years before (starting at 0) the procurement of ship class   Ss ∈
  from plant Pp ∈  requires labor (i.e. in 0,1,...  years before) s 1−spSCb
(# years) 
,  number of years after (starting at 1) the procurement of ship class   SBasp Ss ∈
  from plant Pp ∈  requires budget (i.e. in 0,1,...  years after) s spSBa
(# years) 
,  number of years after (starting at 1) the procurement of ship class   SCasp Ss ∈
  from plant Pp ∈  requires labor (i.e. in 0,1,...  years after) (# years) s spSCa
,  number of years before the procurement of aircraft type a  in which  ABba A∈
  the aircraft is paid (at once) (# years) 
 
 Ship data 
 
,  initial inventory of class  ships (# ships) vsin s
0 Ss ∈
,sycsproc  committed procurement of class  ships in year due to Ss ∈ Yy∈
  production in progress (# ships) 
,vsin s   maximum number of class  ships in inventory (# ships) Ss ∈
,spstot   maximum number of class  ships to procure from plant    Ss ∈ sPp ∈
  (# ships) 
,
spy
sproc  minimum number of class  ships to procure from plant   in  Ss ∈ sPp ∈
  time period y  (# ships) Y∈
  Note: ,
spy
0=sproc  and   
  
1-}max{ spsps SCb,SBby;Pp,Ss ≤∀∈∈∀
,sproc
spy
0= }max{1 spsps SCa,SBa|Y|y;Pp,S −+≥∀∈s ∈∀  is required 
,spysproc  maximum number of class  ships to procure from plant   in  Ss ∈ sPp ∈
  time period y  (# ships) Y∈
  Note: ,spy 0=sproc  and  1-}max{ spsps SCb,SBby;Pp,Ss ≤∀∈∈∀
  ,sprocspy 0= }max{1 spsps SCa,SBa|Y|y;Pp,Ss −+≥∀∈∈∀  is required 
 
 Aircraft data 
 
,0atainv   initial inventory of type  aircraft that are years old (# aircraft) Aa ∈ Tt∈
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,aycaproc  committed procurement of type  aircraft in year due to  Aa ∈ Yy∈
  production in progress (# aircraft) 
,aainv   maximum number of type  aircraft in inventory (# aircraft) Aa ∈
,atainvt  maximum number of type  aircraft in inventory that are t years  Aa ∈ T∈
  old (# aircraft) 
,aatot   maximum number of type  aircraft to procure (# aircraft) Aa ∈
,
ay
aproc  minimum number of type  aircraft to procure during time period Aa ∈
   (# aircraft) Yy∈
,ayaproc  maximum number of type  aircraft to procure during time period Aa ∈
   (# aircraft) Yy∈
,ayiinc   increment i lower bound for the number of type a  aircraft to be  aI∈ A∈
  procured during year y  (# aircraft) Y∈
,ayiinc   increment i upper bound for the number of type a  aircraft to be  aI∈ A∈
  procured during year y  (# aircraft)  Y∈
,aasurvive  survival rate of type  aircraft (fraction aircraft) Aa ∈
,
ay
avgage  minimum average age of type  aircraft at end of year  Aa ∈ Yy∈
(# years of age) 
,ayavgage  maximum average age of type a  aircraft at end of year  A∈ Yy∈
(# years of age) 
,
my
avgmage  minimum average age of mission  aircraft at end of year  AMm ∈ Yy∈
  (# years of age) 
,myavgmage  maximum average age of mission aircraft at end of year  
AMm ∈ Yy∈
  (# years of age) 
 
 Retirement data 
 
,csret sy  minimum cumulative number of class  ships to retire by the end of  Ss ∈
  time period y  (# ships) Y∈
,csret sy  maximum cumulative number of class  ships to retire by the end of  Ss ∈
  time period y  (# ships) Y∈
,sret sy   minimum number of class  ships to retire by the end of time period  Ss ∈
   (# ships) Yy∈
,sret sy   maximum number of class  ships to retire by the end of time period  Ss ∈
   (# ships) Yy∈
,caret ay  minimum cumulative number of type  aircraft to retire by the end of  Aa ∈
  time period y  (# aircraft) Y∈
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,caret ay  maximum cumulative number of type  aircraft to retire by the end of Aa ∈
  time period y  (# aircraft) Y∈
,aret sy   minimum number of type  aircraft to retire by the end of time period  Aa ∈
   (# aircraft) Yy∈
,aret sy   maximum number of type  aircraft to retire by the end of time  Aa ∈
  period y  (# aircraft) Y∈
aarnet   retire no earlier than age for type  aircraft (# years) Aa ∈
 




smreq  number of reference ships required for ship mission m  in time  SM∈
  period y  (# ships) Y∈
,
my
amreq  number of reference aircraft required for air mission  in time AMm ∈
  period y  (# aircraft) Y∈
sseffect  effectiveness of type  ship in relation to reference ship (ship per Ss ∈
  ship) 
ataeffect  effectiveness of type  aircraft of years of age in relation to Aa ∈ t T∈
reference aircraft (aircraft per aircraft) 
 
 Budget data 
 
,yoscn   fixed SCN cost in year  ($) Yy∈
,ncsco y  fixed SCN cost in year  for ships not considered ($) Yy∈
,frac   historical fraction of total SCN cost for ship outfitting ($ per $) 
,yoapn   fixed APN cost in year  ($) Yy∈
,yocapn  fixed APN cost in year  for aircraft not considered in the study ($) Yy∈
,5apn   historical fraction of total APN categories 1 through 4 required for  
  categories 5 through 7 ($ per $) 
,oomy   fixed O&M cost in year  for maintenance not considered ($) Yy∈
, SCN cost incurred l years before q class-s ships are procured from plant p,  tbcoss spql




∈ 1}-10{ spSBb,,,l L=
,tacoss spql  SCN cost incurred l years after q class-s ships are procured from plant p,  




∈ }1{ spSBa,,l L=
,tcosaa ayi  increment Ii ∈  procurement cost for type  aircraft in year   a Aa ∈ Yy∈
  ($ per aircraft) 
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, increment Ii ∈  fixed procurement cost (intercept) for type a  aircraft  tcosab ayi a A∈
  in year y  ($) Y∈
, O&M cost for class  ship in year  ($ per ship) omshipsy Ss ∈ Yy∈
,aytomair  O&M cost for type  aircraft in year  that are years old  Aa ∈ Yy∈ Tt∈
  ($ per aircraft) 
,  committed budget in year  due to ship production in progress ($) csbudget y Yy∈
,ycabudget  committed budget in year  due to aircraft production in progress ($) Yy∈
,  TOA budget lower limit for year  ($) toa y Yy∈
,  TOA budget upper limit for year  ($) toa y Yy∈
,ctoa y   TOA cumulative budget lower limit for year  ($) Yy∈
,ctoa y   TOA cumulative budget upper limit for year  ($) Yy∈
,yairtoa  aircraft TOA budget lower limit for year  ($) Yy∈
yairtoa  aircraft TOA budget upper limit for year  ($) Yy∈
,ycairtoa  aircraft TOA cumulative budget lower limit for year  ($) Yy∈
ycairtoa  aircraft TOA cumulative budget upper limit for year  ($) Yy∈
,myairmtoa  aircraft TOA budget lower limit for air mission  year  ($) 
AMm ∈ Yy∈
myairmtoa  aircraft TOA budget upper limit for air mission   year  ($) AMm ∈ Yy∈
,mycairmtoa  aircraft TOA cumulative budget lower limit for air mission m  year  
AM∈
   ($) Yy∈
mycairmtoa  aircraft TOA cumulative budget upper limit for air mission m   year  AM∈
   ($) Yy∈
 
 Labor data 
 
, committed labor in year  at plant  due to production in  claborpy Yy∈ Pp ∈
  progress (# workers) 
, required labor n years before q class-s ships are procured from plant p, for  sworkbspqn




∈ }10{ spSCb,,,n L=
,sworkaspqn  required labor n years after q class-s ships are procured from plant p, for  




∈ }1{ spSCa,,n L=
,pcap
py
 minimum production capacity at plant  in time period  Pp ∈ Yy∈
(# workers) 
,pcap py  maximum production capacity at plant  in time period   Pp ∈ Yy∈
  (# workers) 
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DECISION VARIABLES (and units) 
 
 Variables expressing violations of elastic constraints 
 
,  objective function value F
AM
myα ,  air mission m  shortage in year  (# aircraft) AM∈ Yy ∈
SM
myα ,  ship mission m  shortage in year  (# ships) SM∈ Yy ∈
AGE




,  air mission  average age excess in year  (# years of age) AMm ∈ Yy ∈
+α y
−B
,  budget excess in year  ($) Yy ∈
α y
+AB
,  budget shortage in year  ($) Yy ∈
yα
−AB
,  air budget excess in year  ($) Yy ∈
yα
+AMB
,  air budget shortage in year  ($) Yy ∈
myα
−AMB





,  air mission budget shortage in year  ($) Mm ∈ Yy ∈
α y
−CB
,  cumulative budget excess in year  ($) Yy ∈
α y
+CAB
,  cumulative budget shortage in year  ($) Yy ∈
yα
−CAB
,  cumulative air budget excess in year  ($) Yy ∈
yα
+CAMB
,  cumulative air budget shortage in year  ($) Yy ∈
myα
−CAMB





,  cumulative air mission budget shortage in year  ($) Mm ∈ Yy ∈
α y
−L
,  labor excess in year  (# workers) Yy ∈
α y ,  labor shortage in year  (# workers) Yy ∈
 
 Main decision variables 
 
,APROCayi  number of type  aircraft to procure at the start of year  in cost  Aa ∈ Yy∈
  increment Ii ∈  (# aircraft) a
,aytARET  number of type  aircraft to retire by the end of year  that are  Aa ∈ Yy∈
   years old (# aircraft) Tt∈
,SPROCspyq  one if facility  is to deliver q  class  ships at the start of  Pp ∈ spyQ∈ Ss ∈
  year y , and zero otherwise (0-1 variable) Y∈





 Control decision variables 
 
,APayi   one if aircraft  is procured at the start of year  in cost  Aa ∈ Yy∈
  increment Ii ∈ , and zero otherwise (0-1 variable) a
,aytAINV  inventory of type  aircraft at the start of year that are t   Aa ∈ Yy∈ T∈
  years old (# aircraft) 
,mytAMINV  inventory for air mission  at the start of year  that are t   
AMm ∈ Yy∈ T∈
  years old (# aircraft) 
,SINVsy  inventory of class  ships at the start of year  (# ships) Ss ∈ Yy∈
,SMINVmy  inventory for ship mission  at the start of year  (# ships) 
SMm ∈ Yy∈
, amount of SCN money to budget for year  ($) SBUDGETy Yy∈
,  amount of APN money to budget for year  ($)  ABUDGETy Yy∈
,myAMBUDGET  amount of APN money to budget for air mission  year  ($) 
AMm ∈ Yy∈
,yOMBUDGET   amount of O&M money to budget for year  ($) Yy∈
, total amount of money to budget for year  ($) BUDGETy Yy∈
































































































































































































     (6) YyAa ∈∀∈∀ ;
 






iyayaaayt APROCcaprocasurviveAINV  
       1;1; =>∈∀∈∀ tyYyAa  (8) 
 
,)1)(1( −−∗= tyaaayt AINVasurviveAINV  
 aarnettTtyYyAa ≤<∈∀>∈∀∈∀ 1;1;  (9) 
 
,)( )1)(1()1)(1( −−−− −∗= tyatyaaayt ARETAINVasurviveAINV      









































Mm A ∀∈∀ ;
   











at AINVaeffectavgmageAINVaeffectt ),()( α  


























     (19) YyAa ∈∀∈∀ ;
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  (26) Yy ∈∀
 
,yyyy OMBUDGETABUDGETSBUDGETBUDGET ++=   (27) Yy ∈∀
 
,        (28) BUDGETtoa y
B
yy +α≤ − Yy ∈∀
 

















yy ABUDGETairtoa +≤ −α       (32) Yy ∈∀
 


















y cairtoaABUDGET ≤− +
≤∈




mymy AMBUDGETairtoa +≤ −α     (36) YyMm A ∈∀∈∀ ;
 



















my cairtoaAMBUDGET ≤− +
≤∈






























                       
                       
         (40) YyPp ∈∀∈∀ ;
 
,      (41) LABORpcap py
L
pypy
+α≤ − YyPp ∈∀∈∀ ;
 
,      (42) pcapLABOR py
L
pypy ≤α− + YyPp ∈∀∈∀ ;
 
 Non-negativity and bounds 
 
,0≥aytAINV        (43) TtYyAa ∈∀∈∀∈∀ ;;
 
,atayt ainvtAINV ≤       (44) TtYyAa ∈∀∈∀∈∀ ;;
 
,       (45) vsinSINV ssy ≤≤0 YySs ∈∀∈∀ ;
 
,0≥mySMINV         (46) YyMm s ∈∀∈∀ ;
 
,      (47) sretSRETsret sysysy ≤≤ YySs ∈∀∈∀ ;
 
,0≥ySBUDGET         (48) Yy ∈∀
 
,0≥yABUDGET         (49) Yy ∈∀
 
,0≥myAMBUDGET        (50) YyMm A ∈∀∈∀ ;
 
,0≥yOMBUDGET         (51) Yy ∈∀
 
,0≥yBUDGET         (52) Yy ∈∀
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,0≥pyLABOR        (53) YyPp ∈∀∈∀ ;
 
0α ≥            (54) 
 
 Fixed variables 
 
,0=ayiAPROC      (55) aa ABby|Yy;Ii,Aa ≤∈∀∈∈∀
 




,10 =spySPROC   (57) max{1 spsps SCa,SBa|Y|y|Yy;Pp,Ss −+≥∈∀∈∈∀
 
 Binary/Integer variables 
 
,ZAPROCayi
+∈        (58) YyIiAa a ∈∀∈∈∀ ;,
 
,+∈ZARETayt         (59) TtYyAa ∈∈∀∈∀ ;;
 
},1,0{∈ayiAP         (60) YyIiAa a ∈∀∈∈∀ ;,
 
},1,0{∈spyqSPROC      (61) spys QqYyPpSs ∈∀∈∀∈∈∀ ;;,
 





The above equations (1) Enforce exactly one quantity of ships is procured for 
delivery in a given year; (2) Calculate ship inventory; (3) Limit the number of ships per 
plant over the horizon; (4) Procure aircraft in no more than one cost segment; (5) Limit 
aircraft procurement each year in the chosen cost segment; (6) Limit aircraft procurement 
in all cost segments; (7) Set the first year inventory equal to starting values; (8) Calculate 
age 1 aircraft inventory after first year; (9) Calculate pre-retirement age aircraft inventory 
after first year; (10) Calculate retirement age aircraft inventory after first year; (11) Limit 
maximum aircraft inventory; (12) Limit the number of aircraft procured over the horizon; 
(13) Limit minimum aircraft inventory average age; (14) Limit maximum aircraft 
inventory average age (elastic); (15) Limit minimum mission inventory average age; (16) 
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Limit maximum mission inventory average age (elastic); (17) Limit cumulative ship 
retirements; (18) Limit cumulative aircraft retirements; (19) Limit aircraft retirements; 
(20) Calculate ship mission inventory; (21) Limit minimum ship mission inventory 
(elastic); (22) Limit minimum air mission inventory (elastic); (23) Calculate ship budget 
(SCN); (24) Calculate air mission budget (APN); (25) Calculate aircraft budget (APN); 
(26) Calculate O&M budget; (27) Calculate total budget; (28) Limit minimum budget 
(elastic); (29) Limit maximum budget (elastic); (30) Limit minimum cumulative budget 
(elastic); (31) Limit maximum cumulative budget (elastic); (32) Limit minimum air 
budget (elastic); (33) Limit maximum air budget (elastic); (34) Limit minimum 
cumulative air budget (elastic); (35) Limit maximum cumulative air budget (elastic); (36) 
Limit minimum air mission budget (elastic); (37) Limit maximum air mission budget 
(elastic); (38) Limit minimum cumulative air mission budget (elastic); (39) Limit 
maximum cumulative air mission budget (elastic); (40) Calculate labor per plant; (41) 
Limit minimum labor (elastic); (42) Limit maximum labor (elastic). Equations (43) 
through (54) are non-negativity constraints and bounds for inventories, retirements, 
budgets, labor, and elastic variables. Equations (55) through (57) fix to zero, deliveries of 
ships and aircraft for those years that require production and payment schedules before 
the first year of the planning horizon. Equations (58) through (62) define procurement 
and retirement binary and integer variables. 
Equations (14), (16), (21), (22), (28) through (39), (41) and (42) use elastic 
variables. The elastic variables take on a continuous non-negative value as each 
associated constraint is violated. The CIPA APU objective function minimizes penalties 
associated with violating the respective budget, mission inventory, average age, and labor 
constraints. 
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